

Agency, 2nd ed. rev., 1934). Some *kārikās* are taken from Jha's translation as noted in the text.

The selections in section B are taken from *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, containing (1) *Sāṃkhya-pravacana Sūtra* (14th century A.D.), with the *Vṛtti* of Aniruddha (15th century A.D.), and the *Bhāṣya* of Vijñāna Bhikṣu (16th century A.D.), and extracts from the *Vṛtti-sāra* of Mahādeva Vedāntin (18th century A.D.); (2) *Tattva-samāsa*; (3) *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*; and (4) *Pañca-sikha Sūtra*, translated by Nandalal Sinha, Sacred Books of the Hindus, xi (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1915).

A. THE SĀMĀKHYA-KĀRIKĀ

1. From torment by three-fold misery arises the inquiry into the means of terminating it; if it be said that it is fruitless, the means being known by perception,¹ no [we reply], since in them there is not certainty or finality.²

The three kinds of pain constitute [what is ordinarily called] the "triad of pain." These are: (1) the intrinsic (*ādhyātmika*), (2) the extrinsic (*ādhibhautika*) and (3) the divine or superhuman (*ādhidāivika*). Of these, the intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold: extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones are due to the evil influence of planets and the various elementals.³

An objection is raised: "... Hundreds of remedies for bodily pains are laid down by eminent physicians; for mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments, and the like. Similarly, of extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations, and the rest."

[Reply] ... though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

¹ Perhaps a better translation of *dṛṣṭi* would be "being obvious," instead of "being known by perception."

² The translations of the *kārikās* (verses) and the commentary are free rather than literal. The translators have placed in parentheses many words and phrases necessarily implied in the Sanskrit. For the sake of facility of reading, the editors have omitted the parentheses, but have put into brackets words and phrases which are purely explanatory additions.

³ For "elementals," read "spirits."

ii. The scriptural means of terminating misery is also like the perceptible;¹ it is verily linked with impurity, destruction,² and surpassability;³ different therefrom and superior thereto is that means derived from the discriminative knowledge of the evolved,⁴ the unevolved,⁵ and the knower.

... The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious remedies [mentioned before];—both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kinds of pain...

... The impurity lies in the fact of the *Soma* and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds...

The properties—"decay" and "inequality"—belong really to the effect, but are here attributed to the means. This liability to decay is inferred from the fact of heaven being a positive entity and a product. Further, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of heaven only, whereas the *Vājapeya* and others lead to the attainment of the kingdom of heaven [or "self-sovereignty"]. This is what constitutes the inequality spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

The literal meaning of the words of the *kārikā* is as follows: The means of removing pain, consisting in the direct discriminative knowledge of the spirit (*puruṣa*) as apart from matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the spirit as distinct from matter is also good; and, of these two, the latter is better, superior.

iii. Primal Nature (*prakṛti*)⁶ is not an evolute; the seven,⁷ beginning with the Great One [i.e., *mahat*, the intellect] are both evolutes and evolutes; the sixteen [i.e., the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind, and the five gross elements] are only evolutes; the spirit is neither evolute nor evolute.

... of this matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum*.

iv. Three varieties are recognised of the means of correct knowledge—perception, inference, and valid testimony, all means of correct knowledge being comprehended in these; the knowledge of what is to be known depends, verily, on the means of correct knowledge.

¹ See p. 426, footnote 1.

² Or "inequality."

³ Or "unmanifested."

⁴ Or "decay."

⁵ Or "manifested."

⁶ *Prakṛti* may also be translated "root-matter" or "primordial matter" or "matter," as in Jha.

⁷ The "seven" are intellect, individuation, and the five subtle elements—to be described later.

v. Perception is the ascertainment of objects [which are in contact with sense-organs]; inference, which follows on the knowledge of the characteristic mark (*liṅga*) [i.e., the middle term] and that which bears the mark [i.e., the major and minor terms] is said to be of three kinds;¹ as for valid testimony, it is incontrovertible knowledge derived from verbal statement.

... Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) *a priori* ("pūrvavat"), (2) *a posteriori* ("śeṣavat"), and (3) based on general observation ("sāmānyatodṛṣṭa").

... all the other means of cognition,—such as "analogy" and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

vi. Knowledge of objects beyond the senses comes from inference based on analogy; what knowledge is obscure and not attainable even thereby is gained by valid testimony.

vii. Non-perception may be because of extreme distance, extreme proximity, injury to the organs, non-steadiness of the mind, subtlety, veiling, suppression, and blending with what is similar.

viii. The non-perception of that [i.e., Primal Nature] is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence, since it is perceived in its effects; the great one (*mahat*) [i.e., the intellect] and the rest are its effects, which are both like and unlike their cause—Nature.²

ix. The effect is existent; (1) because what is "non-existent" cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect; (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) because the effect is of the same essence as the cause. [Jha]

x. The evolved is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mobile, manifold, dependent,³ mergent, conjunct [i.e., with parts] and heteronomous;⁴ the unevolved is the reverse of all these.

xi. The manifest is "with the three attributes" (*guṇas*),⁵ "undistinguishable" (or "non-separative"), "objective," "common," "insentient" and "productive." So also is Nature. The spirit is the reverse, and yet also [in some respects] similar. [Jha]

"With the three attributes"—That is to say, the manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain, and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the spirit.

¹ See *Nyāya Sūtra*.

² Or "supported."

³ The term "*guṇas*" may be translated "attribute" or "quality," but technically they are not qualities distinguishable from substance; they are constituents rather than qualities.

⁴ See *kārikā* xxiii.

⁵ Or "dependent."

"Undistinguishable"; just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also, the Great Principle (*buddhi*),¹ being connate with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature....

Some people have held that it is idea (*vijāna*) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain, and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this idea that could possess these [pleasure, etc.] as its attributes. In opposition to this view it is asserted that the manifest is "objective"; "objective" here stands for "what can be apprehended." That is, it is exterior to the idea.—And because it is "objective," therefore, "common"—i.e., apprehended simultaneously by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the idea, then in that case,—in as much as ideas, being in the form of "functions," belong specially to particular individuals,—all that is "manifest" would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the idea of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [manifest substance such as] the glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the cause if it were otherwise [i.e., if the glance were a mere idea].

"Yet also similar"; that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being "without cause" and the rest, yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of being devoid of the three attributes and the rest.

xii. The attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain, and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action, and restraint; and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive, and co-operative.² [Jha]

Now to explain: (1) "*mutually subjugative*"—The attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other;... (2) "*mutually supporting*"... what is meant by "support" here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. (3) "*mutually productive*." That is to say, one can produce its effects only when resting on the other two. By *production* here is meant modification, and this is always of the same character as the parent attribute. This is the reason why this "modification" is not regarded as "caused" [produced], what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it non-eternal, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "*mutually co-operative*." That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another.

xiii. The *sattva* attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the *rajas* attribute exciting and mobile; and the *tamas* attribute

¹ That is, the intellect. *Mahat* (the Great Principle) and *buddhi* represent the cosmic and the individual aspects of intellect.

² Read *kārikā* xiii with xii.

sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of the lamp. [Jha]

We have all observed how the wick and the oil—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light;...the three attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end;—“for the single purpose” of the emancipation of the spirit.

xiv. The properties of being “undistinguishable” and the rest are proved by the existence of the three attributes¹ and by the non-existence of these [i.e., the three attributes] in their absence.² And the existence of the unmanifest [i.e., Nature] too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause. [Jha]

...“by the non-existence of these in their absence”; that is, where the said properties of “being undistinguishable” and the rest are absent,—as in the *spirit*,—the three attributes of *sattva* etc., are non-existent.

xv. Because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, because of separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects),—there is the Unmanifest as the cause. [Jha]

This “distinguishing” or separation from the final cause, the highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately [as with earth, etc.] or immediately [as with the Great Principle]—is what is meant by the “distinction between the cause and its product.” Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, ... merges into its cause, ... and thereby disappears, ... and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple....

“Because of the finite nature of specific objects”;...“because of being measured, i.e., finite.” [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic form]—The specific objects in question, the Great Principle and the rest, have an unmanifested entity for their cause [i.e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state],—because they are finite,—like the jar and other things:—the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, in which inhere the unmanifested state of the effects; we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest unmanifest which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further unmanifested reality.

¹ That is, in Nature (*prakṛti*).

² That is, in the spirit (*puruṣa*).

...“because of homogeneity.”—“homogeneity” consists in the similarity of the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest—manifesting themselves as “volition” and the rest—are found to be “homogeneous” in the sense that they consist in pleasure, pain, and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause wherein it inheres, something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the unmanifest [i.e., Nature] is the cause.

xvi. There is the unmanifest as the cause gone before; it operates through the three attributes, by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the attributes. [Jha]

“By modification like water”;—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though naturally of itself having one taste, becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent, and hot, according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples, and so forth; in the same manner [owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the attributes], the attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications in the state of various products.

xvii. (a) Because all composite objects are for another's use, (b) because there must be absence of the three attributes and other properties, (c) because there must be control, (d) because there must be someone to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards “isolation” or final beatitude, therefore, the spirit must be there.

The spirit must be there, apart from the unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (a) “Because all composite objects are for another's use”—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the “I-principle,” and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent, and other things. Nature and the rest are all “composite,” being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain, and delusion.

“Because there must be absence of the three attributes and other properties.”—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., “being for another's use,” we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite objects *ad infinitum*;... Thus then, in order to escape the *regressus ad infinitum*, if we accept the non-composite nature of spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being “without the three attributes,” “distinguishable,” “non-objective” [i.e., subjective], “uncommon” [i.e., specific], “sentient,” and “not productive.” Because “being with three attributes” and other properties are always accompanied by that of “being composite,” which

latter being absent in the spirit, must lead to the inference of the absence of the three attributes, . . .

"Because there must be control"; that is to say, because the objects constituted by the three attributes are such as "are always controlled";—as a matter of fact it is found that everything consisting in pleasure, pain, and delusion [i.e., in the three attributes] is controlled by something else—e.g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to "consist in pleasure, pain, and delusion"; therefore, they must have a "controller"—and this "controller" must be beyond the three attributes and independent;—and this is the spirit.

Again there must be the spirit "because there must be someone to experience." The term "someone to experience" indicates the *objects* of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must be something other than the feelings themselves to which they can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products, as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves, as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain, and delusion. Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the spirit.

. . . in as much as there is a tendency in all scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards "isolation," there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest,—and this is the spirit.

xviii. The plurality of spirits certainly follows from the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death and of the endowment of the instruments of cognition and action, from bodies engaging in action, not all at the same time, and also from differences in the proportion of the three constituents.

. . . Some persons abounding in the *sattva* attribute represent aggregates of that attribute—e.g., the deities and saints; others abound in the *rajas* attribute,—such as men; others again in the *tamas* attribute,—such as beasts. This "diversity" or "differentiation" due to the distribution of the attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

xix. And from that contrast,¹ it follows that the spirit is "witness," and has "isolation," "neutrality," and is the "seer," and "inactive." [Jha]

Thus, the "contrast" of the character of "having the three attributes, etc.," and the rest . . . connotes the spirit's property of being without the

¹ This contrast is that which has been explained in *kārikā* xi.

three attributes and being "distinguishable," "non-objective," "not common," "sentient," and "non-objective." Now the characters being "sentient" and "non-objective" also indicate the characters of being "witness," and "seer." Since it is only a "sentient" being that can be a "seer," and one can be a "seer," and one can be a "witness" only when the things have been shown to him, as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing the object of their dispute to the *witness*, similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the *witness*. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an object and insentient; and since the spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the *witness*. For the same reasons, the spirit is also the "seer."

Further, from the absence of the three attributes in the spirit follows its *isolation*—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this property, as belonging to the spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the spirit being by its very nature without the three attributes, and hence without pleasure, pain, or delusion.

From the absence of the attributes, again, follows *neutrality*; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain who can be called *neutral*—also called *udāsīna* (indifferent). Lastly, the *inactivity* of the spirit follows from its being "distinguishable" and "non-productive."

xx. Thus from this union, the insentient "evolute" appears as if "sentient"; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the attributes, the spirit, which is neutral, appears as if it were active. [Jha]

The word "evolute" ("*liṅga*"), here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the "union," i.e., proximity of the spirit with the "evolute."

xxi. For the perception of Nature by the spirit and for the isolation of the spirit, there is union of both,—like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution. [Jha]

"For the isolation of the spirit"—The spirit, while in union with the "enjoyable" Nature, believes the three kinds of pain—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this [self-imposed bond] he seeks liberation, isolation; this isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the spirit and the three attributes; this discrimination is not possible without the Nature. . . . thus it is that for his own isolation the spirit needs Nature.

"From this union proceeds evolution." The said "union" [of spirit with Nature] cannot by itself suffice either for "enjoyment" or "isolation" if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the *union* itself brings about the evolution for the sake of "enjoyment" and "isolation."

✓ xxii. From *prakṛti* (primordial matter, Nature) issues *mahat* (*buddhi*, the Great Principle); from this issues *ahankāra* (I-principle); from which proceed the "set of sixteen"; from five of this "set of sixteen" proceed the five elementary substances. [Jha]¹

... The "set of sixteen" is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements proceed respectively the five elementary substances (*ākāśa* [ether], earth, water, air, and fire).

xxiii. Intellect is determinative. Virtue, wisdom, non-attachment, and the possession of lordly powers constitute its *sāttvika* form [i.e., its form when the constituent *sattva*, goodness, predominates]; the reverse of these are of its *tāmasa* form [i.e., of its nature, when *tamas*, darkness, preponderates].

... Now "determination" consists in the notion that "this should be done," and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of, *buddhi* (the "Great Principle," will),² which acquires sentience from its proximity to the sentient faculty of the spirit; and "*buddhi*" is regarded as not different from the said "determination"... this also constitutes the "definition"... of *buddhi*, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things.

Having thus defined *buddhi*, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom, states the properties of *buddhi*, as abounding in the *sattva* and *tamas* attributes: "Virtue, etc. etc.," Virtue "leads to prosperity and the highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity, and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold *yoga* lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the attributes (as constituting Nature) and the spirit. Dispassion is absence of attachment [or love].

Power also is a property of *buddhi*, and it is to this that the perfections, attenuation and the rest (*aṇimā*, etc.) are due.

These four are the properties of *buddhi*, abounding in the *sattva* attribute. Those abounding in the *tamas* attribute are the reverse of these—viz., vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness.

xxiv. Individuation is conceit in the ego. Therefrom, creation³ proceeds in two ways, as the eleven-fold aggregate and as the five-fold subtle elements.

xxv. The "set of eleven" abounding in the *sattva* attribute, evolves out of the "*vaikṛta*" form of the "I-principle"; the set of rudimentary

¹ See *kārikā* III.

² The word "will" used in Jha's translation stands for "*buddhi*," which is usually translated as "intellect."

³ "Evolution" should be substituted for "creation" throughout the text.

substances from the "*bhūtādi*" form of the "I-principle"; and both of them from the "*taijasa*" form of the "I-principle."¹

"The set of eleven," the sense-organs, being illuminative and buoyant, is said to abound in the *sattva* attribute; and it proceeds from the "*vaikṛta*" "I-principle." From the "I-principle" as dominated by the *tamas* attribute proceeds the set of rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in the *sattva* attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

... from the "*taijasa* form," that is, from the form abounding in the *rajas* attribute, proceed both, the "set of eleven" as also the "set of rudimentary substances." Even though there is no separate product from the *rajas* attribute exclusively by itself, yet [it is a necessary factor as] the *sattva* and *tamas* attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not perform their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the *rajas* attribute that they perform their functions; thus the *rajas* attribute is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, *sattva* and *tamas*. Thus it is not true that the *rajas* attribute serves no useful purpose.

✓ xxvi. Eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin are called organs of cognition; voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation are said to be the organs of action.

✓ xxvii. Of these [sense-organs] mind partakes of the nature of both [sensory and motor]: it is the "observing" principle, and is called a "sense-organ" since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the attributes. [Jha]

"Partakes, etc."—Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both—i.e., it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action, since the eye and the other sensory organs, as well as speech and other motor organs, are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the mind.

... "It is the observing principle"—That is to say, mind is defined by observation; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as "a thing," there follows the definite cognition in the form "it is such and such a thing, not that"; and it is this observing, i.e., the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended,—that is done through the mind.

¹ (a) "*vaikṛta*," (b) *bhūtādi* and (c) *taijasa* are purely technical term-names applied to the three forms or states of the "I-principle." When the "I-principle" is dominated by the *sattva* attribute, it is called "*vaikṛta*"; when it is dominated by the *tamas* attribute, it is called "*bhūtādi*"; and when it is dominated by the *rajas* attribute, it is called "*taijasa*." These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.

"It is a sense-organ." Why? "Because it has properties common to sense-organs." The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause the "I-principle" abounding in the *sattva* attribute...

xxviii. Bare awareness, in respect of sound, etc., is acknowledged to be the function of the five organs of cognition, while of the five organs of action, the functions are speech, grasping, motion, excretion, and sexual enjoyment.

xxix. Of the three [the internal organs—intellect, individuation, and mind], the functions consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in the five breaths (*prāṇa*) and the rest.

...the sense... is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs also denotes its respective function; thus "determination" of the will, "egoism" of the I-principle, and "observation" of the mind.

... "The five breaths constitute the common function." The five "vital airs" i.e., the *life* itself—form the common function of the three internal organs, since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent...

xxx. With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs¹ are said to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible [as well as perceptible] things, the functions of the three internal organs are preceded by that [i.e., the cognition of some perceptible object]. [Jha]

With regard to imperceptible things, on the other hand, the [three] internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs. "The functions of the three are preceded by that," i.e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since inference, testimony, and remembrance—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things,—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception [of perceptible things]. The sense is that in regard to "perceptible" as well as "imperceptible" things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

xxx. The organs, external and internal, discharge their respective functions, prompted by mutual impulsion; the goal of the spirit is alone the cause; by nothing else is any instrument actuated.

xxxii. Instruments [or organs] are of thirteen varieties; they function by grasping, sustaining, and disclosing; their objects, which are of the nature of what is grasped, sustained, or disclosed, are ten-fold.

¹ That is, the three internal organs and the organ of one outer sense.

The "thirteen organs" consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle, and the will... "Having the functions of seizing, sustaining, and illuminating,"—respectively; that is to say, the motor organs have the function of seizing, that is, they take up their respective objects; i.e., extend their activities over them;—the will, the I-principle, and the mind "sustain" things through their function in the shape of the vital airs and the rest [mentioned before]; and lastly, the sensory organs "illuminate" [or render perceptible] their respective objects.

xxxiii. The internal organs are three; and the external, ten, exhibiting objects to the former three. The "external" organs act at the present time, and the "internal" at all the three points of time. [Jha]

xxxiv. Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. Speech is concerned with sound; the rest are concerned with five objects. [Jha]

... The term "specific" here stands for the gross sound [touch, colour, taste, and odour] in their "calm," "turbulent," and "deluding" forms, as manifested in the form of earth [water, air, fire and *ākāśa*];—and "non-specific" stands for the subtle forms of sound, etc., manifested as the rudimentary elements.

"The rest," i.e., the four other motor-organs—the arms, the generative organ, the hands, and the feet—are "concerned with five objects"; because the jar and such other objects, which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of sound, colour, touch, taste, and odour.

xxxv. For the reason that the intellect with the other internal organs ascertains the nature of objects of sense, the internal organs are the principal ones, while the rest of the organs are the entrances thereto.

xxxvi. [The external organs together with the mind and the I-principle], characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the attributes, resemble a lamp in action; [and as such] having first illumined [or rendered manifest] the whole of the spirit's purpose, present it to the will. [Jha]

xxxvii. In as much as it is the will that accomplishes the spirit's experiences, and again it is will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and spirit [it is will that is regarded as superior to the other two]. [Jha]

xxxviii. The rudimentary elements are "non-specific"; from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be "specific," because they are calm, turbulent, and deluding. [Jha]

...what the particle "mātra" [in the term "tanmātra," which is the name of the rudimentary elements] connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that "specific character" consisting of the "calmness, turbulence, and delusiveness" which would make them objects of direct experience.

... "From these, etc.," from the five rudimentary elements of sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour proceed respectively the five gross elements—ākāśa, air, fire, water, and earth—these "five" proceeding from the aforesaid "five" rudimentary elements.

... The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, ākāśa and the rest, some abounding in the *sattva* attribute are calm, pleasing, illuminating, and buoyant; others abounding in the *rajas* attribute are turbulent, painful, and unstable; the rest abounding in the *tamas* attribute are deluded, confounded, and sluggish. These gross elements, thus perceived to be distinguished from one another, are said to be *specific* and *gross*. The rudimentary elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be *non-specific* and *subtle*.

xxxix. (1) The "subtle" bodies, (2) "those born of parents," and (3) the "gross" elements,—these are the three kinds of the "specific." Of these, the "subtle" bodies are everlasting, and "those born of parents" are perishable. [Jha]

... (1) subtle bodies which [are not visible, but] are postulated [in order to explain certain phenomena]; ... Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of "specific" objects, "bodies born of parents" the second kind, and the "gross elements" the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar are included in this last.

xl. The "mergent" [subtle] body formed primevally, unconfined, lasting, composed of will and the rest down to rudimentary elements, migrates, is devoid of experiences, and is invested with dispositions.

"Formed primevally";—when the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, was the subtle body, one for each spirit. This body is "unconfined," untrammled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting," since it continues to exist all the time from the first evolution to the final dissolution...

"It migrates," i.e., the subtle body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed physical body after the other.—"But why?"—Because it is "devoid of experience," that is to say, because the subtle body by itself without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

... The "dispositions" are virtue and vice, wisdom and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness; and it is the will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the subtle body is

connected with the will; hence the subtle body becomes invested with those dispositions:...

"Why should not the subtle body—like Nature—last even after the final dissolution?"

Because it is "mergent," that is to say, because it dissolves into Nature. This mergent character of the subtle body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; i.e., having a cause, it must merge into it.

xli. Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate, or a shadow without a post or the like, so too the cognitive apparatus [*liṅga*: intellect, etc.], does not subsist supportless, without what is specific [i.e., a subtle body].

The term "*liṅga*" here stands for the will, the I-principle, and the rudimentary elements, because they are the means of knowing and these cannot subsist without a substrate....

xlii. Formed for the sake of the spirit's purpose the subtle body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of "causes and effects" and by union with the all-embracing power of Nature. [Jha]

"Formed for the spirit's purpose," the subtle body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection with the "causes" in the shape of virtue, vice, etc.—and "effects" in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of virtue, etc. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paraśurāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree.

xliii. Virtue and other dispositions are—(a) natural, which are innate, and (b) incidental; and these are related to the "cause"; and the ovum, etc., related to the "effect." [Jha]

... The "incidental" dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man;...

The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after birth.¹

xliv. By virtue is obtained ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom results the highest good, and bondage from the reverse. [Jha]

xlv. From dispassion results "mergence into Nature"; from attachment which abounds in the *rajas* attribute, transmigration;

¹ Gauḍapāda has taken the *kārikā* as setting forth three kinds of dispositions—(1) "*sām-siddhika*," innate, (2) "*prākṛtika*," natural due to the operation of Nature, primordial matter, and (3) "*vaiṅkṛtika*," incidental.

from power, non-impediment; and from the reverse, the contrary. [Jha]

"From *dispassion results mergence into Nature.*" Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of the spirit, become merged into Nature. "Nature" here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as "spirit," become absorbed into these [i.e., those mistaking the senses for the spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on]; that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

XLVI. This aggregate of sixteen—[eight causes and eight effects, mentioned in the last two verses]—is a creation of the intellect, and is distinguished as ignorance, infirmity, complacency, and attainment [or success]. Their varieties due to the suppression of one or more of the constituents, because of their relative inequalities in strength, are fifty in number.

XLVII. Five are the varieties of ignorance; the varieties of infirmity due to organic defect are twenty-eight; complacency [or contentment] is nine-fold, and attainment eight-fold.

XLVIII. Of error there are eight forms; as also of delusion; extreme delusion is ten-fold; gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also "blind gloom."¹

XLIX. Injuries to the eleven organs along with the injuries to the intellect are declared to constitute infirmity; the injuries to the intellect are seventeen resulting from the failure of the nine-fold complacency² and the eight-fold attainment.

... Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly, success being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold, thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the will.

L. The nine forms of contentment have been held to be the following: Four internal, named Nature (*prakṛti*), (2) means (*upādāna*), (3) time (*kāla*), and (4) luck (*bhāgyā*); and five external due to the abstinence from objects. [Jha]

The *contentment* called "Nature" consists in that feeling of satisfaction which the disciple has on being told that "discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, etc. So, my child, remain as you are!..."

¹ Or "utter darkness."

² Or "contentment."

The second form of *contentment* arises from the following instruction: "Wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of nature, because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of Nature functions equally for all individuals; such wisdom can only be attained through renunciation, and so, O long-living one, thou must have recourse to renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named means..."

The *contentment* that follows upon the feeling of satisfaction arising from the instruction that renunciation also cannot bring about emancipation at once; renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of renunciation... [This is the third form of contentment.]

The fourth form of *contentment* is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following: "Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from Nature nor from any other *means* [such as renunciation], nor does it depend solely upon *time*, but it comes only by *luck*;..."

The external forms of *contentment* are next described: The *external forms* are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.,—the five objects of sense.

LI. The eight attainments are the proper use of reasoning, oral instruction from a teacher, study, the three-fold suppression of the three kinds of misery, the intercourse of friends, and purity; those mentioned before [viz., ignorance, infirmity, and complacency] are the three-fold curb on attainment.

LII. Without the "subjective," there would be no "objective," and without the "objective" there would be no "subjective." Therefore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the "objective" and the "subjective." [Jha]

The term "objective" (*liṅga*) stands for the evolution out of the rudimentary elements, and "subjective" (*bhāva*) for the evolution out of the will.

That is to say, experience, which is the purpose of the spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies [subtle and physical]. Hence the necessity of the *objective* evolution;—conversely, that same experience is not possible without the organs of experience, in the shape of the sense-organs and the internal organs; and these are not possible without virtue and the other dispositions. Lastly, the discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final end [emancipation], is not possible without both these forms of evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of evolution established.

LIII. The "celestial" evolution has eight forms, the "animal" has five; the "human" has only one form; thus in brief is the "material" evolution. [Jha]

LIV. In the worlds above, there is predominance of *sattva* (goodness); in the sphere of the lower order of creation, *tamas* (darkness) predominates; in the middle, *rajas* (passion) predominates; this is so from Brahmā down to a blade of grass.

LV. Therein does the sentient spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body]; thus pain is in the very nature of things. [Jha]

"Therein"—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of pleasure; and yet the pain of "decay and death" is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—“may I not cease to be; may I continue to be,” etc.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.

LVI. This evolution from the will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the modifications of Nature (*prakṛti*). This work is done for the emancipation of each spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself. [Jha]

...“this” evolution—from the will onwards down to the elements—is brought about by Nature itself; it is neither produced by a God [as held by the Naiyāyika] nor is it an evolution from *Brahman* [as held by the Vedāntin]; nor is it without cause [as held by the atheist]. If it were the latter, there would never be any evolution at all or it would be eternally going on;—nor can it be said to be evolved from *Brahman* [the Vedānta view], for there can be no modification of what is pure intelligence [which is *Brahman*, as postulated by Vedānta]. Nor, again, can evolution be brought about by Nature, as controlled by God, as no controlling can be done by one who is not active, e.g., an inactive carpenter does not manipulate his tools.

Objection: “Granted that the evolution is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active, and, as such, her operations should never cease; so that there would be no emancipation for the spirit.”

Answer:—“The evolution is for the emancipation of each spirit, and appearing as if it were for Nature's own sake is really for the sake of another.” A cook having finished the cooking in which he was engaged retires from the work; similarly Nature, being urged to action for the emancipation of the spirit, brings about this emancipation and thereafter stops her operations with regard to that spirit whom she has already liberated [and, thus emancipation is not impossible]. This action for another's sake is just like the action for one's own benefit.

Objection: “Granted all this. But it is only a sentient being that acts either for its own or for another's purpose; and Nature, being insentient, cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient controller [over her blind force]; the spirits residing in the bodies cannot

be such controllers, because such conditioned spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other omniscient sentient being who controls *ab extra* the operations of Nature,—and to this Being we give the name of God.”

LVII. As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the spirit.

It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends; e.g., the milk, which is insentient, flows for the nourishment of the calf. Similarly, Nature though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the spirit.

It would not be right to urge that “the flow of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action does not afford an instance vitiating the general proposition that the actions of insentient things are due to the control of sentient beings”;—the activity of every sentient being is always found to be due either to selfishness, or to benevolence; neither of these is applicable to the case of the “creation of the Universe,” and, therefore, it follows that the said creation cannot be due to the action of a sentient agent. Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the spirits would be without bodies, organs, and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable noose of “interdependence”: creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and, again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deeds, then what is the necessity of postulating an intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of an intelligent agent would mean [according to the opponent] that the *deeds* of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs, and objects, could not be produced,—and the result of this would be that there would be no pain; so that the removal of pains would be very easy! [and there would be no ground for God's compassion].

As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus, in this case, none of the above incongruities arise; the only motive of Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the *kārikā* is quite appropriate.

LVIII. Just as in the world one undertakes action in order to be rid of desire by satisfying it, even so does the Unevolved¹ function for the release of the spirit.

¹ Or Unmanifest.

LIX. As a dancer desists from dancing, having exhibited herself to the audience, so does Primal Nature desist, having exhibited herself to the spirit.

LX. Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, brings about by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the spirit, who is devoid of attributes, and confers no benefit in return. [Jha]

LXI. It is my belief that there is not any other being more bashful than Primal Nature, who because of the realisation "I have been seen" never again comes into the view of the spirit.

LXII. Of a certainty, therefore, not any spirit is bound or liberated, not does any migrate; it is Primal Nature, abiding in manifold forms, that is bound, is liberated, and migrates.

Verily no spirit is bound; nor does any migrate; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates, and is released. Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers, because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—grief or profit—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of spirit from Nature, as has been already explained...

LXIII. Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form she causes deliverance for the benefit of the spirit. [Jha]

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"; i.e., by virtue and other dispositions¹ [all properties of the will] except wisdom. For the benefit of the spirit in the shape of experience and final release, she releases herself by herself, "by means of one form," i.e., by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same spirit

LXIV. Thus, from the repeated study of the truth, there results that wisdom, "I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not," which leaves no residue to be known, is pure, being free from ignorance, and is absolute.

... "I am not" merely precludes all action from the spirit; ... And since there is no action of the spirit, there arises the idea of "not-I"; "I" here stands for active agency in general, ...

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence, "I am not," means that "I am the spirit, not productive" and because non-productive, "I have no action"—"Not I"; and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

¹ See *kārikās* XXIII and XLV and the commentary on *kārikā* LXV.

LXV. Thereby does the pure spirit, resting like a spectator, perceive Primal Nature, which has ceased to be productive, and, because of the power of discriminative knowledge, has turned back from the seven forms [i.e., dispositions].

... The seven forms of evolution,—virtue, vice, error, dispassion, passion, power and weakness—are all due to erroneous knowledge...

LXVI. "She has been seen by me," thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases to act. Hence, though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution. [Jha]

... "There is no motive for evolution." A "motive" is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no "purpose of the spirit."

LXVII. Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, the spirit remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impressions, like the whirl of the potter's wheel, which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse.

LXVIII. When the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,—then he attains eternal and absolute isolation. [Jha]

LXIX. This abstruse doctrine which is accessory to the attainment of the goal of the spirit, and wherein are considered the existence, origin, and dissolution of beings, has been fully expounded by the Great Sage [Kapila].

LXX. This supreme purifying knowledge, the sage first handed on, in compassion, to Āsuri; Āsuri passed it on to Pañcaśikha; by him the doctrine was elaborated.

LXXI. This which was handed down through a succession of pupils has been compendiously set down in Āryā metre, after fully comprehending the final doctrine, by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, whose intellect had approximated to the truth.

LXXII. The subjects of the seventy verses are, verily, those of the entire science of sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting also the discussion of rival views.

and non-acceptance of gifts. We should observe purification (internal and external), contentment, austerity, and devotion to God. Posture is a physical aid to concentration. Breath-control aids serenity of mind. Abstraction of the senses from their natural functions helps to keep the mind still. These five steps are indirect or external means to *yoga*. In fixed attention we get the mind focussed on a particular object. Contemplation or meditation leads to concentration. *Yoga* is identified with concentration (*samādhi*), where the self regains its eternal and pure free status. This is the meaning of freedom or release or salvation in the Yoga system.

Through yogic practices, one can attain supernormal powers. The classical authors do not encourage the acquisition of these powers, as they consider spiritual calm and moral virtue to be superior to magical powers, which are only incidental to the attainment of the true goal of spiritual freedom.

For the source from which selections are taken, see footnote 1.

THE YOGA SŪTRA¹CHAPTER I: CONCENTRATION (*SAMĀDHI*)1. Now a revised text of *yoga*.²

Yoga is contemplation (*samādhi*),³ and it is a characteristic of the mind pervading all its planes. The planes of the mind are:—

Wandering (*kṣipta*); forgetful (*mūḍha*); occasionally steady or distracted (*vikṣipta*); one-pointed (*ekāgra*); and restrained (*niruddha*).

Of these the contemplation in the occasionally steady mind does not fall under the heading of *yoga*, because of unsteadiness appearing in close sequence. . . . *T.B.*⁴

The commentator now removes the doubt as to the meaning of the word "*yoga*," which arises from its ordinary connotation. Thus says he, "*Yoga* is contemplation." The word "*yoga*" is derived from the root *yuj*, to contemplate, and not from the root *yujir*, to join, in which latter case it would mean conjunction.⁴ *T.V.*

2. *Yoga* is the restraint of mental modifications. *citta - vṛtti*

The mind is possessed of the "three qualities,"⁵ showing as it does the nature of illumination, activity, and inertia. . . . *T.B.*

¹ Selections are taken from *The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali*, with the *Yoga-bhāṣya* of Vyāsa (4th century A.D.) and the *Tattva-vaiśārādī* of Vācaspati Miśra (ca. 850 A.D.), translated by Rama Prasada, Sacred Books of the Hindus, iv (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 3rd ed., 1924). All the *sūtras* are quoted, with commentary where necessary for explanation or clarity.

² Or "Now an explanation of *yoga*."

³ *Samādhi* may be translated variously: as contemplation, concentration, trance, super-conscious state, etc.

⁴ For convenience, the *Yoga-bhāṣya* is indicated by "*T.B.*" and the *Tattva-vaiśārādī* by "*T.V.*"

⁵ These are the three *guṇas* or constituent elements of things. They are described fully in the selections from the Sāṅkhya system in Chapter XII.

That particular state of the mind in which the manifestations of real cognition, &c., have been restrained, is the state of *yoga*. *T.V.*

3. Then the seer stands in his own nature.

. . . The objects of the *puruṣa* (self)¹ are discriminative knowledge and the experience of the objective world. These two no longer exist in the state of inhibition (*nirodha*) *T.V.*

4. Identification with modifications elsewhere.

. . . The conscious principle (*puruṣa*) is not unaffected by whatever may be the modifications of the mind in the state of outgoing activity. And so in the aphorism: "Knowledge is but one; discrimination alone is knowledge."

The mind is like a magnet energized by nearness alone. Being seen it becomes the possession of its lord, the *puruṣa*. Therefore the reason for knowing the modifications of the mind is the eternal relation of the *puruṣa*. *T.B.*

. . . The notions, "I am calm," "I am ruffled," "I am forgetful," appear by fastening the modifications of the will-to-be upon the conscious principle, by taking the will-to-know and the conscious principle to be one on account of proximity, as in the case of the white crystal and the Japa [Chinese rose] flower. This happens in the same way as one looking at his face reflected in a dirty mirror becomes anxious, and thinks, "I am dim. . . ." And similarly does this *ātma* [or *ātman*] (self) appear to possess false knowledge, although in reality he has no false knowledge. He appears as the enjoyer, although he is not the enjoyer. He appears as possessed of discriminative knowledge, and illuminated thereby, although devoid of it in reality. *T.V.*

5. The modifications are five-fold, painful and not-painful.

. . . The painful are those that cause the afflictions and become the field for the growth of the vehicle of actions (*karmāśaya*). The not-painful are those that have discrimination for their object and which oppose the functioning of the "qualities. . . ." *T.B.*

6. Real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, deep sleep, and memory.²

7. Perception, verbal cognition, and inference are real cognitions.

8. Unreal cognition is the knowing of the unreal, possessing a form not its own.

9. Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal expression and knowledge, and is devoid of objective substratum.

¹ "*Puruṣa*" (self or spirit) will not be translated in this chapter. For a complete explanation of the concept, see selections from the Sāṅkhya system in Chapter XII.

² These are the five modifications referred to in *sūtra* 5, above.