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Essays on Practical Ethics

In Pursuit of the Public Interest

What does the injunction "serve the public interest" really mean for public managers, and why is it important? By way of an answer, this analysis systematizes different perspectives on the public interest and offers a multifaceted formulation of the public manager's duty. It is a process involving the exploration of two concerns—democracy and mutuality—in the current time frame and two others—sustainability and legacy—in the future time frame.

What does the injunction "serve the public interest" really mean for public managers, and why is it important? Often, the answer draws on the definition of "public interest" provided by the American journalist, essayist, and social critic Walter Lippmann: "The public interest may be presumed to be what . . . [people] would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently" (1956, 40). Yet as Douglas F. Morgan asks, "How do we know the public interest when we see it?" (2001, 153).

Why even raise this question? After all, decades ago, the concept of public interest sank into disrepute among social science positivists because it is broad, diffuse, fuzzy, and fluid and therefore ill suited to empirical research conducted according to accepted scientific standards (Morgan 2001, 166–67). One dictionary of political science dismisses the topic altogether: "[T]he term may refer to the aggregate of individual interests, whatever that is, like the 'common good' and the 'general will,' it is easier to talk about it than to determine what it is" (Bealey 1999, 274; see also the entry on "interests," 243–46). Others may see the public interest as an effort to identify particular interests with general interests or to camouflage self-interested advocacy. H. George Frederickson (2004) captures a political science argument: "In an elected democratic policy the public interest is whatever the majority in Congress or the president say it is."

That such arguments miss the point of the question posed at the beginning of this essay is evidenced by the fact that public interest as an ideal, analytic tool or a heuristic device (such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau's general will) has long been of vital interest to philosophers (Frederickson 1994; Weale 1998), analysts, and practitioners (Goodsell 1990; Herring 1936; Schubert 1960). It also survives in normative public administration theory (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Gawthrop 1998). The ideal is prominent in governmental and professional standards of practice, including the professional code of the American Society for Public Administration, whose very first precept enjoins members to serve the public interest and to "serve the public, beyond serving oneself" (see www.aspanet.org/scriptcontent/index_codeofethics.cfm). Likewise, the recommendations for managing conflict of interest in the public service issued in 2003 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development affirm, "Serving the public interest is the fundamental mission of governments and public institutions" (OECD 2003). These standards transform the civic ideal into a duty for public managers.

The duty to pursue the public interest is defined here by two demands that are made on professionals in public service: (1) to reflect on its many facets disclosed through broad representation and dialogue, and (2) to engage genuinely the duties and values associated with four aspects of public interest: democracy, mutuality, sustainability, and legacy. Forming the common core of many formulations, these four aspects of public interest are arrayed in numbered columns in table 1. In this author's view, a sincere pursuit of the public interest addresses each aspect in sequence, and none is dismissed. The centrality of democratic values, especially as a constraint on administrative arrogance, excess, or incompetence (Morgan 2001, 173) drives the sequence of columns 1–3. The fourth column, legacy, is logically dependent on the third, sustainability. (Moreover, the sequence is implicit in the four obligations described here.)
Table 1 is designed to be a tool that public managers can use to begin exploring their responsibility to pursue the public interest. The table packages public interest concerns the way they often come to managers concerned with who, when, democracy, and ethics—the what, of course, is the public interest. Table 1 organizes the four umbrella categories by dominant focus. Two categories relate to public managers’ responsibility to the present: democratic concerns and individual or private interests on the one hand and mutual interests and ethics on the other hand. The other two categories speak to public managers’ responsibility to future generations: ensuring a viable future by preserving resources and ensuring the capacity to sustain life and to preserve and transmit civilization’s cultural, intellectual, artistic, and historical legacy.

The four categories shown in Table 1 obviously cross the many roles, values, and duties associated with public service. Each is associated with seven important features: focus or core concerns, theoretical base, method or technique, emphasized or distinctive role, and the central problems and do’s and don’ts associated with each category. Finally, the table provides illustrations for each category.

Given the unavoidably squishy, fluid nature of the idea, how can we squeeze it into the neat rows and columns shown in the table? With caution and qualification, and with certainty that others will disagree with the categories and select other attributes (for example, see Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Goodsell 1990). So be it. It is far better for others to argue or alter entries and disagree on the niceties than to sidestep the topic. Given “the range of connotative differences among public interest, public good, public service, common good . . . even commoneal and general welfare” (Catron 2004), ambiguity is inevitable. What makes it so difficult to pin down the idea of public interest is what makes it so intellectually interesting and professionally compelling. It is broad, vibrant, dynamic, and ideally, inescapable, and it is “arguably, vague, general, abstract, inherently ambiguous, paradoxical, complex and compound” (Catron 2004). To some degree, the breadth (and hence ambiguity) of the public interest concept underlies its power. It is surely linked to its longevity; this concept has developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1 Sum of diverse private interests, aggregate demands</td>
<td>Constitutional analysis, civic virtue, ascribed social needs, common good, mutual or shared interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Teleology, especially utilitarianism, pluralism, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations</td>
<td>Deontology, communitarianism, civic republicanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Balance competing popular preferences, cost-benefit analysis, public opinion polls</td>
<td>Constitutional analysis, regime values, professional values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator’s role</td>
<td>Delegate, agent</td>
<td>Statesman, trustee, steward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core problems</td>
<td>Externalities, tyranny of the majority, exclusion, contending publics and interests</td>
<td>Elitism, representation, individual liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core proscriptions</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Conflict of interest, bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core prescriptions</td>
<td>Responsiveness, accountability, neutral competence</td>
<td>Civic virtue, impartiality, public trust, citizenship, social goods, benevolence, political legitimacy</td>
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mutated, and adapted over thousands of years and in hundreds of societies. The purpose here is to give us a handle on the task, not a final take on the issue.

As a public service duty, the public interest is conceptualized more fruitfully as a process, not as an objectively identifiable endpoint. An elusive and sweeping obligation, it is a never-ending process that is made meaningful more by practice than by a product. "It can be simultaneously seen as both a state of being and an ongoing process. Its quality and significance are bound up in both the process of seeking it and in the realization that it must always be pursued" (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003, 67). As Terry L. Cooper asserts, "The function served by the concept of public interest is not so much one of defining specifically what we ought to do or even providing operational criteria for particular decision-making problems, rather it stands as a kind of question mark before all official decisions and conduct" (1998, 77). It is a moving target in the sense that its content changes along with its time frame and focus.

Manageability and brevity force selectivity, and much of the discussion that follows focuses on the U.S. experience. In counterpoint, Richard Vengroff (2004), a specialist in comparative public administration, notes the limitations:

Our British cousins certainly contributed to Woodrow Wilson's thinking in their concerns for bureaucratic neutrality, accountability, professionalism, and responsiveness. The Napoleonic conceptions of public administration based on a "Cartesian" approach to universal administrative law (droits publics) are at the base of much continental (including German) thinking about public interest and also have had some influence. I do not want to drag this back to Canon Law, ancient Greek philosophy, the Talmud, or Confucian thought, but clearly the base of thinking about the public interest is historically and theoretically richer than we find in most U.S. analyses. At least reference should be made to the alternative approaches and historical roots of the modern U.S. conception of the public interest.

Public Interest in the Present
In the first column of Table 1, the public interest evokes democratic values, and it is the sum of individual, private interests articulated as political demands that the political system, including the public manager, must aggregate into public action.

President Abraham Lincoln's famous formulation in the Gettysburg Address, delivered on November 19, 1863, is "government by the people, of the people, for the people." In an 1887 article that is often credited with initiating public administration as a field of academic study in the United States, Wilson advanced the principle that "administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion... The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question" (22). Methods that are closely associated with this approach include cost-benefit analysis and public opinion polls on government receptivity (e.g., the survey question on government receptivity and responsiveness in the National Election Studies; see www.umich.edu/~nes).

One critical problem with an approach to public interest that calls for balancing private interests is the potential for degradation into the tyranny of the majority (Morgan 2001, 157), with little or no protection or voice for minority positions. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison observed, "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Another problem, according to Lippmann, is parochialism:

In ordinary circumstances voters cannot be expected to transcend their particular, localized, and self-regarding opinions. As well expect...[people] laboring in the valley to see the land as from a mountain top. In their circumstances, which as private persons they cannot readily surmount, the voters are most likely to suppose that whatever seems obviously good to them must be good for the country, and good in the sight of God. (1956, 41)

Therefore, it is useful—if not imperative—for public managers to start their pursuit of the public interest with private interests, as it is here that receptivity and accountability are strong and democratic norms are clear and dominant. Again, in Wilson's words, "The principles on which to base a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at heart" (1887, 24). For the democratic values and norms associated with
the public interest, one turns to the fundamental documents—in the United States, to the U.S. Constitution (Rohr 1978).

A calculation of the public interest from private interests alone is not enough. The goals of democratic action specified in the preamble to the Constitution relate to mutual interests and common concerns, including justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, general welfare, and liberty. We read in Federalist No. 57 that the "aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society."

Let's pose a question: What distinguishes public service from other endeavors? Part of the distinction lies in many professional managers' motivation to make a positive difference and foster a better community. The civic virtue that is implicit in this distinction activates the second facet of the public interest: ethics, mutuality, or as some prefer, the common good. According to one definition, "In order to achieve the common good civil leaders and individuals alike must seek what is good for the whole of society rather than what promotes individual or minority interests. For individual citizens, regard for the common good requires bringing private interests in line with the needs of the community" (Duval 1999, 43–44; capitalization omitted). This formulation stands in contrast to an economic orientation wherein the common good is conceived as the aggregate satisfaction of individual preferences. For example, one assessment of government's fulfillment of this facet of the duty to pursue the public interest is shown in responses to the question in the National Election Studies, "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" (see www.umich.edu/-nes).

It is in the mutual-interest realm of public interest (shown in the second column of table 1) that ethical norms, especially justice and benevolence, are added to democratic obligations. Louis Oawthrop asserts that "the ethos of public service, so essential for the spirit of democracy to flourish, can be realized only if directed by a moral imperative bound to the common good" (1998, xiii). Here, then, the moral aspect is emphasized and associated with a more inclusive approach to public service. The argument is deceptively simple: "Given the resources, power, and uneven sharing of benefit and harm in the public service enterprise, we cannot afford to lose sight of what is right" (Lewis and Gilman, Chapter 1).

Recognizing the "processes of government as a moral endeavor... to assist in bringing the ideal into existence," H. George Frederickson and David K. Hart posit a "special relationship" between public servants and citizens: "[A] public administration must rest upon, and be guided by, the moral truths embodied in the enabling documents of our national foundation" (1985, 548, 551). To democratic duties, they add "the intentional incultation, and practice of, benevolence" and develop a "model for the public service—the combination of patriotism (the love of the regime values) with benevolence (the love of others) that is realized in action" (547–48).

The distinctive role associated with this second facet of public interest is stewardship, which Kass defines as the "administrator's willingness and ability to earn the public trust by being an effective and ethical agent in carrying out the republic's business" (1990, 113), which "signifies the achievement of both effectiveness and ethicality" (129). The inclusive aspect may be thought of as statesmanship: "[T]he word 'statesman,' when it is not mere pomposity, connotes a... [person] whose mind is elevated sufficiently above the conflict of contending parties to enable... [him or her] to adopt a course of action which takes into account a greater number of interests in the perspective of a longer period of time" (Lippmann 1929, 280).

The interests of subgroups are usually associated with the first category, private interests, which are numerous and diverse. As Bayard Catron (2004) points out, professionals in public service are often obliged by their particular programmatic domains not to serve the whole public, but a sub-public, and a specialized rather than common good (for example, the mentally ill but not the physically disabled). Even within programmatic jurisdictions, the injunction to serve the public interest loses its forceful punch when administrators allocate effort across incommensurables, such as supporting treatment for ten patients whose condition can be improved rather than one chronic, "hopeless" patient. . . . Public interest provides no operational decision rule or test, and thus little guidance to public administrators juggling compound and often conflicting criteria in discharging their duties.

The specialization that is inherent in professions and job descriptions necessarily narrows managers' job responsibilities. Yet it is the idea of the common good and a sense of community that prompt public managers to consider legitimate claims (i.e., those that are deemed fair, just, and innocent) advanced on behalf of weak and vulnerable subgroups. This, the ethical obligation to help those in need, plus the legal mandate provide the ethical grounding for managers' obligations with respect to protected subgroups such as the mentally ill and the disabled (under special education programs and the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example). The combination of obligations makes the matter all the more grave.
Authentic devotion to both democratic and ethical values and norms reduces the threat to individual liberty that is posed by the imposition of a fabricated or arbitrary version of the common good. Claiming to represent the public good, some public officials and technical experts may confound the public interest by confusing it with their own preferences and biases. For example, in 2003, when the elected chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court defied a federal district court order to remove a monument depicting the Ten Commandments from public display in the courthouse rotunda, a violation of the First Amendment’s establishment clause, the state court’s associate justices ordered compliance, cited Article VI of the Constitution, and wrote that they were “bound by solemn oath to follow the law, whether they agree or disagree with it” (Alabama Supreme Court 2003). A special nine-member judicial court removed the chief justice from the bench, although he may be reelected or seek another public office in the future (Gentleman 2003). The lesson here is to resist letting either of the first two aspects of the public interest—private interests or mutual interests—trump the other and to repeat the lesson when balancing the democratic and ethical facets associated with identifying what is, in fact, the public interest.

Public Interest and the Future

The preamble to the Constitution goes further on the subject of liberty. It is to be secured for “ourselves and our posterity” (emphasis added). This shifts attention to the future-looking aspects of the public interest: sustainability and legacy. Frederickson (1994) asks, “Can public officials correctly be said to have obligations to future generations?” In answering, he cites the future orientation in the pledge of ancient Athens, which was designed for citizens rather than for public officials. Let us now fast forward to more recent examples: In the United States, Yellowstone National Park was established by an act of Congress in 1872; the Antiquities Act of 1906 initiated a national policy of historic preservation; and President Wilson signed the law creating the National Park Service in 1916. Today, the Park Service’s vision and management policies still derive from this law: “to promote and regulate the use of the…national parks…which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (NPS 2001; see also Pitcaithle 2001). Likewise, the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act recognizes “the responsibilities of each generation as a trustee of the environment for succeeding generations” (§101, 42 U.S.C. §4331). An international illustration is the founding of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO; see http://portal.unesco.org) in 1945 and the adoption in 1972 of its World Heritage Convention, which seeks to protect cultural treasures and natural habitats (the World Heritage List boasted 754 properties as of 2003). In 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Leon Sullivan initiated the Global Compact based on the Sullivan Principles of corporate social responsibility, advocating corporate responsibility to “promote sustainable development” (see www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm).13 Obviously, then, it is widely accepted practice to extend the public for whom the public interest is being explored to encompass future generations.

The moral responsibility here rests on future generations’ vulnerability to current decisions with irreversible repercussions. To this, we add public managers’ responsibility to hear otherwise silent voices in the process by which the public interest is defined. Again, the combination of responsibilities makes them weightier.

Extending the public interest to include the future is not without its problems, and two concerns are particularly acute. The first is that future needs often must be traded for current interests, and they are a feeble voice for advocating current sacrifice. In this regard, Catron (n.d.) specifies,

... the acid test of stewardship: Are we willing to accept that our obligation to future generations constrains property rights? ... If we accept that we have even modest responsibility to future generations, we are constrained—potentially significantly so—in our current uses of both public and private property. This is nicely captured in the saying (perhaps Native American, but also attributed to Emerson) that “we do not inherit the land from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children,” which conditions ownership or stewardship.

The second is that demagogues may try to use future generations to justify current oppression and repression. Here it bears repeating that, in a sincere pursuit of the public interest, each aspect is addressed in sequence and none is dismissed.

There is perhaps no better illustration of the worldwide recognition of the legacy obligation to future generations than the international reaction to the looting of Iraq’s National Museum of Antiquities during the spring of 2003. When the news broke, the media, international and professional associations, and museum and archeology sites on the Internet blazed with concern and condemnation of the United States’ failure to safeguard the museum. Initially, 170,000 artifacts and art treasures were reported lost; one archaeologist described it as “a rape of civilization” (Booth and Gugliotta 2003). In May, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 imposed a worldwide ban
on illicit trade in Iraqi cultural property (UNESCO 2003). By June, it was known that only 33 important pieces from the main collection were missing. Donny George, a senior official at the Baghdad Museum and a respected archeologist, noted, "But look, these things can never be replaced. That is why they call them priceless" (Booth and Gugliotta 2003). By September, the total number of missing pieces was reduced to about 10,000 (Bogdanos 2003).

International experts, Iraqi cultural experts, UNESCO, Interpol, and others have been active in efforts to restore and preserve the artifacts. According to Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, a marine reservist called from his work as a public prosecutor in New York City to head the U.S. investigation into the looting (armed with degrees in law and classical studies), of the more than 3,400 items recovered as of September 2003, more than 1,700 were returned by Iraqis under an amnesty program, and other items have been seized in Baghdad at checkpoints and borders and in Jordan, Italy, Britain, and the United States. His analysis of the evidence "suggests three dynamics at work": professionals targeting valuable items, indiscriminate looters, and insiders with access and keys. He observes, "It must be stressed that the loss of a single piece of mankind's shared history is a tragedy. It is equally clear that numbers cannot possibly tell the whole story. Nor should they be the sole determinant used to assess the extent of either the damage done or the recovery achieved." Bogdanos articulates the legacy obligation, stating that the pieces "are indeed the property of the Iraqi people, but, in a very real sense, they are the shared property of mankind. I speak for all when I say we are honored to have served" (Bogdanos 2003).

The duty to serve the public interest also requires us to anticipate the inescapable tensions between current uses and future needs and between private interests and mutual interests. These tensions may surface over debt and inter-generational equity, regulations for snowmobiling in Yellowstone (Barringer 2003), the Environmental Protection Agency's rules on pollution emissions (Seelye and Lee 2003), and other issues. And surface they will.

A panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (1997, 7; see also Catron 1994) has adopted useful ethical guidelines for thinking about the future aspects of public interest and how they may be weighed ethically against current claims on the public interest. The guidelines articulate the following principles:

- Trustee principle: Every generation has an obligation to protect the interests of future generations.
- Sustainability principle: No generation should deprive future generations of the opportunity for a quality of life comparable to its own.
- Chain of obligation principle: Each generation's primary obligation is to provide for the needs of the living and succeeding generations. Near-term concrete hazards have priority over long-term hypothetical hazards.
- Precautionary principle: Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic consequences should not be pursued unless there is some compelling, countervailing need to benefit either current or future generations.

These guidelines discriminate between the near-term and the long-term future and between concrete and speculative risks. Very much to the point, Kristin Shrader-Frechette (1998) argues, "Most risk problems can be solved only by ethical analysis and democratic process: The most important aspect of risk is not scientific but ethical."

Conclusion

The catalogue displayed in table 1 may clarify the issues, but it does not and may not substitute for each public manager's reflection, dialogue, decision, and responsibility to discover, weigh, balance, and protect the public interest of present and future generations. In this formulation, in which a large part of the task is to broaden the discussion, the time frame, and the roster of participants, public interest is a process—an exploration—rather than an immutable or even identifiable conclusion. As an aid in cutting through distortion and pretension, this approach may inform the assessment and rejection of misrepresented schemes and underserved claims to serve the public interest.

Alternatives to formulations such as the one offered here include ignoring the concept or simplifying it, thereby reducing the pursuit of the public interest to a checklist, for example. Tidy, but neither ideal nor useful because the concept's practical meaning and power are lost. "In sum," Alexis Halley (2004) observes, "the answer to the question asked at the beginning of this discussion is that serving the public interest is at the heart of public service, and the meaning public managers give to public interest is a function of their ongoing application of democratic values and ethics, in present and future time frames, to the enterprise of public service." As Aaron Wildavsky put it, "For public administrators, the second question is how well you accomplish objectives; the first is which objectives it is right to try to accomplish. Answers to the second question matter, but only after the first is settled" (1989, 787). The
choices are hard, the pressures intense, and the stakes incalculable for the public interest and for the public manager's professional persona and personal integrity.

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Notes
1. Frederickson (2004) goes on to say, "One version of this is principal—agent theory; another is agency-capture theory; and another is the administrative law argument that the constitution and the laws express the public interest and any significant deviation from them is a breach of the public interest."

2. From the postmodern or discursive perspective, "[T]he public interest has to be socially constructed through a dialogical process that is open and free from all forms of oppressive constraints" (Morgan 2001, 172). On dialogue and accountability, see Harmon (1995).

3. Although different sources use the terms differently and sometimes interchangeably, in this essay, the term responsibility refers to informal, voluntary assumption of duty, whereas obligation refers to externally imposed, formal, and sanctioned duty.

4. For example, ethics surfaces in each category but rises to the level of focus in mutuality; so as not to diminish the role of ethics in all formulations of the public interest and to highlight the distinctive aspect of this view, the category is termed mutuality.

5. Though some managers may prefer to collapse these into a single future orientation, they are separated here to encourage our exploration of the obligations and the implications of their different foci.

6. Robert Bifulco (2004) points out that when private interest is operationalized using the techniques of cost–benefit analysis, "willingness to pay" is used to measure the intensity of preferences.


8. Catron (2004) notes, "Others might be drawn by security needs, or patriotism, or quasi-religious zeal, or personal challenge, or power. Or yes, career advancement and money, as when appointees emerge on the other side of the revolving door to find that their eighteen months of public service has doubled their market value as lobbyists, contractors, lawyers, and more."

9. The distinction between trustee and steward that is sometimes made in the literature is not useful here, and so here the terms are used interchangeably. The link between effectiveness and ethics is the theoretical underpinning of the go/no-go model outlined in Lewis and Gilman (2005, 65).

10. The courts have issued conflicting rulings over such displays, and the debate continues as to whether they violate the establishment clause of the Constitution (AP 2002; Roig-Franzia 2003).

11. Article VI of the Constitution reads, "Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution."

12. The National Park Service lists among its guiding principles, "Wise decisions: Integrating social, economic, environmental, and ethical considerations into the decision-making process" (NPS 2001).

13. In 1977, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a member of the board of directors of General Motors, a large employer in South Africa, initiated the Sullivan Principles, which were aimed at persuading U.S. companies to treat South African employees like their U.S. counterparts and to use economic pressure to undermine apartheid and advance human rights and justice.

14. See, for example, the Cultural Property Protection Net Mailing List (archives available at www.museum-security.org/iraq.html), whose reports provide a chronology of events surrounding the Baghdad Museum and the Baghdad Museum Project.

References


