Race, politics, and the police chief
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Editor's introduction

This is the classic "tough" case in local politics. It pits the officers in the police department against their chief; it embodies the prejudices and tensions so frequently associated with contemporary race relations and issues with a racial component; it demonstrates the varying political styles of elected mayors and the impact on the administration of a change in mayoral style; and it puts the manager in the "hot seat" of having to solve an emotion-laden political problem that has no obviously "right" solution.

Central to the case is a key issue: a lack of congruence between the administrative and political dimensions of the problem. That problem—poor performance by the police chief—has an obvious administrative solution: The police chief should be replaced. That solution, however, is politically unacceptable to vocal and influential segments of the community.

The case also demonstrates the episodic nature of many public-sector political decisions. It shows how the nature of the decision problem changes daily as events unfold. Over time, the problem posed in this case is affected by the resignation of the mayor and his replacement by a new mayor, a black man with a very different political style; by active political pressure from the Fraternal Order of Police; by the disclosure of an indiscretion by a senior police officer; by the actions, over time, of the police chief; and, most important, by the political actions and strategies of groups in the city's black community over which the manager could exert neither control nor significant influence.

Overriding all of this, and forcing a response by the manager, is the problem of poor performance and poor morale in the police department. No local chief executive can afford long-term poor performance in this critical function. In this case the members of the department themselves are demanding action. The manager has to act, but any action against the chief is certain to provoke an angry community response. Police operations are the manager's responsibility and the new mayor seems reluctant to get involved. Along with everything else, the manager must decide how proactive a professional administrator should become in promoting the resolution of a conflict that is more political than administrative in nature.

It is situations such as the one portrayed here that give full meaning to Karl Bosworth's assertion, "The manager is a politician."

Case 4
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Background

Valley City Manager Bob Schmidt was faced with a difficult and distasteful decision. His chief of police, John Jones, was under serious fire from within his
department. At the same time, Jones enjoyed strong support from important
elements of the community. It seemed that whatever might be done regarding
the situation, significant groups were likely to be offended, resulting in consid-
erable damage to the city. As he contemplated his range of possible actions,
Schmidt recalled the sequence of events that led to his present dilemma.

John Jones followed an unusual path to the leadership of the Valley City
Police Department (VCPD). Not a sworn officer, he had been "loaned" to
the police department seventeen years earlier by the Valley City Human
Relations Commission, to serve as a civilian assistant to the incumbent chief. He quickly
attracted favorable attention, both from his superiors and from the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP), the bargaining unit for the rank-and-file officers.

While still serving in this civilian position, he achieved recognition for his role
in establishing and heading the department's conflict resolution group and began
to establish himself as a black role model in law enforcement. After about two
years, the city manager, in an effort to fully integrate the police department's
command structure, proposed sweeping reforms that would have placed blacks
at all levels of the department's command structure within eighteen months.
Although not completely implemented (in part because of FOP opposition), the
plan did result in Jones' being named a police major. With this move Jones
became both a sworn officer and the first black on the force to rise above the
rank of sergeant.

This partial implementation of the manager's plan was to have profound, long-
term effects on the VCPD. While some of the department's rank-and-file may
have resented the lateral appointment of a civilian to high police rank, this did
not seem to be a serious problem at the time. Indeed, three years later Jones
was named deputy chief under Chief Peter Flaherty. This position made Jones
the "heir apparent" to Chief Flaherty.

On the other hand, the failure to implement the plan completely signaled to
the city's black community that it faced continuing problems in moving into
Valley City's mainstream. This concern was especially important in light of the
city's precarious economic and political situation. A midwestern industrial center
with a population of just under a quarter of a million, Valley City had a reputation
for innovation and leadership in industry and in government. A pioneer in the
city management movement and the site of several major manufacturing opera-
tions, the city had been known for decades as a prosperous and wellgoverned
community. The governing body was a five-member city council, elected at large
in elections that were nominally nonpartisan. In reality, however, political parties
actively backed candidates for the council, and council members' partisan lean-
ings were readily identifiable. Despite this variation in form, the city had a
tradition of successful use of the council-manager form of government.

This prosperity and political peace began to change in the 1960s and early
1970s as the city experienced the industrial and economic decline that was affect-
ing the entire region. Several major employers shut down, unemployment rose,
and the corporate and business leadership that had once contributed to the city's
success began to leave the area. Politically, the city began to change as its large
black minority (roughly 40 percent of the total population) began to assert itself.
Besides actively supporting candidates sympathetic to their interests, the city's
blacks were concerned with the administration of the city government. This
concern was especially acute in the case of the politically sensitive police depart-
ment, since only 10 percent of its roughly five hundred officers were black.

Flaherty and Jones made something of an "odd couple" as the two highest-
ranking persons on the force. Flaherty, a prototypical "street cop," had risen
through the ranks until, after many years of service, he had achieved ultimate
command. Blunt and outspoken, he was a forceful figure on the force and in
city hall. Jones, on the other hand, was young, college educated, and experienced
in human relations and conflict resolution, and he had an active off-the-job
interest in art. In addition, he lacked formal administrative training and had little experience in managing paramilitary organizations. Vastly different from Flaherty, Jones was clearly a new type of police commander.

Either these personality differences or Jones’ unusual route to the deputy chief position might explain the strained working relationship between the two men. A police chief in a city of Valley City’s size would usually delegate major responsibilities to his deputy, but this did not seem to happen in Valley City. Although he was the second-ranking person on the force for the next eight years, Jones never appeared to be fully involved in citywide police operations and often seemed to be excluded from serious decision making. He did remain visible as a departmental spokesperson on affairs pertaining to the black community, retained his reputation as an innovative and effective human relations-oriented administrator, and continued to serve as a prominent black role model in law enforcement. He was also able to achieve some visibility outside the local area and eventually received serious consideration for a command position in a major metropolitan police force in the northern part of the state. Turning this offer down seemed to cement Jones’ chances of succeeding to the leadership of Valley City’s department. When Flaherty retired, Jones was named chief.

*Shadows over Chief Jones*

The “Jones era” in the Valley City police force was marked by two continuing realities. First, the city was politically dominated by its mayor, Hugh Marion, who brought an explicitly partisan political style to the city government. A long-time Democratic party activist and a former state legislator, Marion saw himself as a “strong mayor” who needed to demonstrate leadership and to concentrate power to be effective. Coming to office with an agenda that included establishing better working relationships with the business community and with the city’s suburbs, Marion quickly established himself as the dominant force in city government, a role that his fellow council members appeared willing to concede to him.

Rumors of partisan control over administrative appointments were prevalent during Marion’s tenure as mayor. Although those charges proved difficult to substantiate, it was clear that Marion’s political strength eclipsed that of his only real opponent on the council—lone Republican Frank Ackerman. The only area politician with sufficient influence to rival Marion was Martin Plunkett, a state representative widely regarded as one of the state’s most powerful black politicians. While focusing primarily on state-level issues, Plunkett enjoyed powerful local support and was capable of wielding considerable influence in Valley City politics—particularly on behalf of the black community.

By assuming the “strong mayor” role, Marion departed from the traditions of council-manager government in two ways. First, he assumed a highly visible position in controversial policy areas. As a political pragmatist, Marion moved to “cash in” politically on the opportunities available in the inevitable conflicts of a city experiencing major demographic change. By assuming this high-profile leadership position, the mayor accrued political support from Plunkett and others in the black community as well as from other groups (such as the FOP) with demands to make on the city government. This extended political involvement allowed Marion to enhance his direct influence over the municipal bureaucracy and to strengthen his ties with the black community (in general) and Martin Plunkett (in particular). It also carried the risk of touching off a political backlash from the FOP and white officers in the department.

Second, Marion departed from the traditional role of the mayor in council-manager government by involving himself in departmental personnel and operations decisions. In effect, the mayor became the police department’s top-level decisionmaker. Although Jones was the titular head, the mayor viewed the chief
and deputy chief more or less as equals in departmental management—the chief focusing on community relations and the deputy chief on operations. In addition, many city hall observers felt that subordinate police officers regularly answered to the mayor regarding day-to-day operations.

The second constant during Jones’ tenure as Valley City police chief was turmoil in the department itself. Barely nine months after Jones’ appointment as chief, the police department’s vice squad conducted a raid in which one Donald Butler was killed. Amid widespread speculation that the raid had been bungled (indeed, Butler was not a suspect but a bystander on the scene), Harriet Butler, the widow, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the city. During the highly publicized trial, which dragged on for several years, Jones was criticized for giving conflicting testimony and for not having kept the vice squad under closer control.

Perhaps even more damaging was another vice-squad–related scandal that broke less than a year later. This one involved allegations of illegal surveillance and unauthorized deals between VCPD vice squad detectives and alleged drug dealers. A special prosecutor’s grand jury investigation resulted in charges being filed against twenty current or former Valley City officers. As a result, a number of officers (including Jones’ deputy chief) quit the force or were forced to resign.

The circumstances surrounding the investigation of police wrongdoing called out for strong executive action, but the chief did not move to fill the vacancies caused by the scandal (perhaps because he was spending the bulk of his time responding to the grand jury probe). Eventually the mayor went on record as being dissatisfied with the chief’s failure to act. Six weeks after the mayor’s statement, the chief responded by announcing a five-point reorganization plan that he described as “an action plan for excellence” (the plan apparently reflected specifications imposed by the mayor).

Finding appropriate candidates to fill the available positions in the department’s command structure proved to be as problematic as dealing with the damage done by the dismissed officers. Acting against the advice of high-ranking friends in the city administration who urged him to act quickly to appoint officers from within, Jones delayed and opted for a national search. The delay may have been due in part to a request from Mayor Marion, who issued a press release suggesting such a search. During the search, the police force’s command structure was further reduced by retirements, leaving vacant three of the force’s four top command positions under Jones.

Eventually, the one remaining senior commander, Major Charles Westwood, was promoted to deputy chief, and the other senior command positions were filled. Two of the new senior commanders were “outsiders” who had been identified by the national search and brought to Valley City as police majors. One, Alvin Jackson, was a black man who had previously served as a commander of detectives in a large southern city. Jackson became the new superintendent of investigations, while the second outsider, Jane Meagher, a white woman with an advanced degree in education and a professional background in law enforcement training, was appointed as superintendent of professional standards. After Stan Spivak, a long-time Valley City officer, was promoted to major and named to fill the remaining senior command vacancy, three of the five most senior command positions on the force were held by persons who had not served as Valley City patrol officers.

Had the VCPD been able to put the scandals to rest after their first airing, the department might have been able to recover. Unfortunately, these fiascoes seemed to have a life of their own. The Butler wrongful-death lawsuit dragged on for several years until the court ruled in favor of Harriet Butler, granting her a multimillion dollar award. Faced with a huge financial loss and flagging public confidence in the police, the city responded by creating a Special Committee
on Police Affairs to review departmental operations in light of the scandals. The Special Committee was to make recommendations to the chief, the city manager, and the council on methods for improving the force. Robert Carter, a local building contractor with considerable interest in downtown redevelopment, was named to head the Special Committee. The Special Committee submitted its report—which, among other things, suggested granting the chief considerably greater discretionary power over promotions—to Chief Jones and Manager Schmidt shortly before Christmas.

The case

After the next election, the city faced a major transition. Mayor Marion had been elected to statewide office and was leaving the city. His successor, Daniel Hayes, was a black man with a professional background in education and several years of service on the city council. Much quieter and less overtly political than Marion, Hayes represented a return to a more traditional Valley City mayoral style.

Police politics

Marion's departure necessitated a special election, held in the spring, that would have pronounced but cross-cutting effects upon Jones and the police department. First, the city's voters elected Peter Wilson, a maverick Democrat, to fill the council seat that Hayes had vacated when he succeeded Marion. Since Wilson (who had previous council experience) was more prone to ally with Frank Ackerman, the sole Republican, than with the other Democrats, his return effectively fragmented Marion's old power base on the council and formed a two-vote block with pro-FOP leanings on the five-member council.

Second, the voters rejected a ballot issue that would have overturned the city's residency rule. This rule, which required all city government employees to reside within the city limits, had been exceptionally unpopular with the unions representing city workers since its adoption nine years earlier. The FOP had been especially active in fighting the rule, both by supporting several unsuccessful lawsuits aimed at dismantling it and by pressuring council members to overturn it. The unions launched a major, but ultimately unsuccessful, campaign to defeat the residency rule in the spring election. The FOP contributed three-fourths of the antiresidency campaign's funding—while some council members and senior administrators, including Jones, contributed to the proresidency campaign.

The residency vote was a significant factor in heightening racial tensions, as city employees demanded the "right of flight" from the city and the school district (widely viewed as deficient). The election campaign politically mobilized these employees (most visibly, police officers), and its failure left them disappointed and bitter. Not surprisingly, strong black support was instrumental to the residency rule's success. In the short term, an overwhelming black vote for residency provided strong support for top municipal management (which had actively backed residency). Over the longer term, heightened black political interest in the city government, especially in the police department, was to mobilize against City Manager Schmidt on behalf of the police chief.

Shortly after the special election, the public was again reminded of the Butler case and the vice squad scandal when a former principal in the drug case accused two detectives of having accepted bribes. The Valley City Examiner gave the story front-page coverage for several days; then the story again faded into the woodwork. A month later Jones and Schmidt announced that they were backing the Special Committee's report. Thus, little remained to be done before the council could formally adopt the committee's findings.
Rebellion in the police department

By summer the Valley City Police Department was under severe strain. Scandals, "bad press," departmental restructuring, the Special Committee report, the residency vote, and the lateral-entry approach to filling senior command positions all had devastating effects on police morale. The severity of this problem became evident in June, when all but two of the force's lieutenants refused to participate in a stress-management seminar supported by Jones. The letter announcing this action (the "lieutenants' letter") was widely interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction within the force's mid-level management. Newspaper accounts of the incident suggested that there was more to the protest than a simple dislike of the prospective seminar. Published reports spoke of complaints of poor communication between senior commanders and mid-level managers, low morale on the force, and simple mismanagement.

A second challenge to the department's leadership emerged at virtually the same time as the "lieutenants' letter," when the FOP announced its concern over the Special Committee's recommendations, especially those giving Jones greater discretionary powers over promotions. This forced Jones and Schmidt to meet with the FOP before presenting their report on the proposals to the council. When Schmidt was finally able to make his presentation, he accompanied it with a strong statement of support for both Jones and the force. After hearing the proposals (and having previously met with the FOP), the council members deferred action, stating that they believed that the proposals needed to provide greater detail regarding implementation.

In early July the Valley City Examiner showed the extent to which the police department's troubles had become a matter of public concern when it editorialized on the department's problems, directing mild criticism at both Jones and his critics. The chief was faulted for not listening sufficiently to his subordinates' complaints and for relying on weak senior commanders. The critics were reminded that Jones wasn't responsible for most of the department's scandal-related problems, which had developed while he was still Peter Flaherty's deputy.

Three days after this editorial, Jones faced the third major challenge to his leadership within as many weeks when a group of sergeants and lieutenants sued him, Schmidt, and the city over the department's merit-pay plan. This plan, which had been in place for several years, was designed to link a manager's annual salary increase with his performance through a type of management by objectives. The thrust of the suit was that the merit pay system was being unfairly manipulated through the establishment of unreasonable and unattainable objectives.

Faced with a virtual revolt by the department's mid-level managers, Schmidt opted to involve the city's director of management and budget, Bob Markham, in the deteriorating situation. Markham was directed to consult with Jones and Deputy Chief Westwood concerning existing management procedures and then to report back on methods for improving the department. Originally off the record, Markham's assignment was made public by Mayor Hayes on July 30—shortly after fifty-seven of the department's sixty-two sergeants signed a letter supporting the lieutenants.

As Markham worked at his assignment, attention began to focus on the two "outside" majors appointed in the wake of the vice squad scandal. Alvin Jackson and Jane Meagher were publicly identified as the "weak" command officers previously described by the Examiner. Westwood, on the other hand, appeared to enjoy a strong following among the mid-level managers and seemed to command greater respect among the department's rank-and-file than did Jackson, Meagher, or, for that matter, Jones himself.

Schmidt met with Jones and Westwood to discuss the situation on August 7. The next day, amid speculation that he had asked Jones to fire the two majors
(but had been refused), Schmidt announced another departmental reorganization. Westwood (while still reporting to Jones) was to be given considerably expanded authority, with all departmental divisions reporting to him. Even more significantly, Jones and Westwood were now to be treated as a team, that is, they would “rise or fall together.” Nothing was said about other possible changes in the department, including the fate of the two majors.

In the wake of these announcements, some observers speculated that Martin Plunkett, the state representative, possibly concerned that recent events had undermined Jones’ position, had contacted key council members on Jones’ behalf. Several days after the meeting of Schmidt, Jones, and Westwood, a group representing various civil rights and church groups announced its public support of Jones and warned of the dangers of “racial polarization” in the department.

The final crises

The brief respite given to the police department by the August 7 announcements ended when Meagher was involved in a minor traffic accident on August 17. Seemingly insignificant at first, the incident became front-page news several days later when it was discovered that she was driving on an out-of-state license at the time of the accident. State law requires that all residents, including police officers, obtain a valid license within a “reasonable period” (usually considered to be thirty days) after moving into the state, and Meagher had been in Valley City for eighteen months. Things became even more complicated when it was discovered that Meagher had obtained a valid in-state license the day after the accident and that the accident report had been altered to reflect her new license number. Ironically, Jackson also obtained his in-state driver’s license following Meagher’s accident.

These “revelations” provided front-page news stories for several days in the late summer and furnished further material for the majors’ departmental critics. Deputy Chief Westwood was rather low-key, expressing understanding of the personal and professional pressures that might lead a person to forget a driver’s license. Other less accommodating supervisors cited the cumulative effect of this affair added to other recent events and raised questions about the majors’ basic competence. Most council members treated the flap as an administrative matter, with the exception of Frank Ackerman, who was quoted as saying that the police department was in “a crisis.”

Although the uproar over Meagher’s woes had waned by the end of August, her fate (as well as that of Jackson) was still very much in question. Finally, on Friday, September 19, the end appeared to have come. Early that afternoon, Jones asked each of the majors into his office, informed them that he had been instructed to fire them, and asked each of them to resign by 5 p.m. or be terminated. Each refused to resign, leaving the next move up to the chief. At the same time, a special, closed-door council meeting was scheduled for the following Monday.

It soon became apparent that the managerial script for a straightforward resolution of the police department’s problems would not be played out as written. By late Friday afternoon Jackson and Meagher were meeting with the Christian Ministers’ Association (CMA), a group of politically active black ministers, and with State Representative Martin Plunkett. Plunkett denounced the move to dismiss the two majors, saying, “It comes down to racism. The FOP is running the city manager, and that means that the FOP is running the city.” A delegation left the meeting to meet with Jones and requested that he hold off any final action on the majors until Monday. Following this meeting (at about 6:30 p.m.), Jones announced that “discussions” regarding the majors’ status were under way and that he would have a statement on Monday.
The CMA met again over the weekend to lay plans for a Monday morning rally at city hall in support of the majors. The rally was timed to coincide with the previously announced council meeting. A CMA spokesman indicated that the ministers feared that the move to dismiss Jackson and Meagher was an overt threat to Jones' status as chief. Reverend Henry Howard, a long-time community activist, related that he had met with Jones several months previously, at which time the chief had expressed satisfaction with the majors' performance. Howard reasoned that since Jones’ appointees were on the block, the chief was very likely in jeopardy as well. In a separate statement, Plunkett conveyed his belief that the firing of the majors was indeed a threat to Jones.

As the city's official spokespersons, Mayor Hayes and Manager Schmidt maintained a discreet silence over the weekend. In contrast, council members George Costantino and Charles Davis issued statements on Sunday denying that the move to dismiss the majors was a racially motivated maneuver (against Jones) and reiterating the council's previous statements supporting the chief. These comments, made by a pair of council members usually considered to be among Jones' supporters, suggested that the chief still retained the core of his council backing.

When the city council met on Monday, it confronted a remarkable scene. An angry crowd of three hundred people filled the council chambers and spilled out into the hallways. Chanting, shouting, and singing “We Shall Overcome,” the crowd made its displeasure known. Plunkett, acting as one of the crowd's spokespersons, attacked Costantino and Davis for denying that racism was the motive for forcing the majors' dismissal. He further charged that the FOP, Schmidt, and Council Member Ackerman were acting together in an effort to undermine Jones. Various other spokespersons lectured on the evils of racism and threatened to turn the coming November election into a referendum on the council's treatment of Jones. Faced with an uncontrollable and potentially explosive situation, the council members retreated into a closed-door session to discuss the situation with Jones.

The chief's statement to the council was a bombshell. Rather than announce that Jackson and Meagher had been dismissed, Jones stated that he had changed his mind—he was retaining them! Denying that he had been swayed by the demonstration, Jones insisted that he had made the move entirely on his own, having arrived at his final decision late Sunday night. In the days following the reversal, news reports suggested that an inconclusive confrontation between the chief and the city manager had taken place during Sunday's wee hours. Allegedly, the chief had argued that he could not in good conscience fire the majors, whom he had himself recruited (within specifications set by the previous mayor).

The announcement of this decision to the crowd produced mass confusion. Plunkett, the ministers, and the rest of the audience were delighted. Some council members, perhaps trying to put the best face on a bad situation, characterized the reversal as proof that indeed Jones, not the FOP or the council, was actually running the police department. Other council members bitterly charged that the day's events had made them "look like fools" and that the city's credibility had been damaged.

By the end of the week, it was all too clear that the more outraged council members had been correct. The situation deteriorated rapidly following Monday's tumultuous events. Schmidt issued his first public criticism of the chief on Wednesday, apologizing for the events and characterizing the chief's handling of the abortive firings as "unacceptable." To make the point even more firmly, the "linkage" between Jones and Westwood, which had been created in early August, was severed. The council, having borne the brunt of Monday's attack, began to reassess its previous support for the chief. The FOP cast a vote of "no confidence" in the chief on Thursday and called on Schmidt and the council to dismiss him. Although the department's mid-level managers (the sergeants and
lieutenants) did not take a formal public stand, it was likely that the FOP's position reflected their own. The Examiner retreated from its generally favorable stance toward the chief in an editorial asserting that the time had come to recognize Jones' "deficiencies as a manager" and to dismiss him.

Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Jones' supporters were far from idle. Their strategy for protecting the chief soon became clear. Rather than allow any decision over the chief's future to be handled as a purely internal personnel decision, Plunkett and the other supporters were determined to transform the debate into a broader one over allegations of racism in Valley City law enforcement. Their tactics would include questioning the force's racial composition and personnel procedures and, most generally, the political role of blacks in Valley City. On another front, rumors surfaced that Jones would sue the city if he were dismissed.

Despite the tension inherent in the situation, no immediate solution seemed likely. Amid a spate of overwhelmingly bad press about the chief, a newspaper survey (conducted by independent pollsters) indicated widespread sympathy for Jones—among both blacks (where support was nearly unanimous) and whites. In addition, another city council election was to be held in November. In this one, Frank Ackerman, the incumbent Republican city council member most closely aligned with the FOP, faced a serious challenge from Odetta Devon, a black woman with close ties to Plunkett. (Some observers speculated that a Devon victory would pose a threat to Schmidt's tenure as city manager.) Both the council and Schmidt wanted to prevent the police controversy from becoming a factor in the November election.

The decision problem

By the end of September, Bob Schmidt was a man with a problem. Troubled by scandals and embarrassing publicity for years, his city's police department had become nearly unmanageable during the previous seven months. Whatever the legitimacy of the FOP's and mid-level managers' complaints, the chief had seriously hurt his own cause by flip-flopping on the decision to dismiss Jackson and Meagher and by allowing the council (and Schmidt) to endure the demonstration after having decided to reverse the firings. This incident seemed to destroy whatever support for Jones had remained in the department and led the council to reassess its position regarding the chief. It was hard to see how the department could be returned to good health under the current management.

The Valley City Charter gave the city manager the power to hire and fire the chief of police. Nonetheless, it was clear that the decision could not be made on exclusively managerial grounds. Plunkett and the CMA had successfully transformed the question into a very public, and very volatile, debate over race relations in the city. This occurred at an exceptionally delicate time in the city's history, since many persons felt that the appearance of serious racial divisions in the city would make it even more difficult for the city's political and business leadership to successfully implement their plans for dealing with the city's economic problems. Dismissing the chief along with the two majors could touch off a firestorm of racial protest that Schmidt was extremely reluctant to face.

With an election coming up, and without former mayor Marion's presence, the council seemed content to see Schmidt "out front" with the Jones situation. Lacking Marion's political savvy, without access to the former mayor's guidance, embroiled in an unfamiliar and uncomfortable public political debate, and with pressure mounting to do something, Schmidt faced his dilemma. Should he dismiss the chief, thereby satisfying the department's membership but possibly touching off a bitter community political power struggle? Or should he retain Jones, thus mollifying the black community but further outraging a rebellious police force and an increasingly disenchanted council?
In contemplating the situation, Schmidt knew well that his current options had been shaped by previous decisions he had made concerning Jones and the department. So it was only natural for him to second-guess his past actions in view of the decision-forcing events discussed earlier.

When Schmidt's thoughts returned to the situation at hand, he realized that the heightened level of controversy over Jones' about-face regarding the majors clearly required decisive action from the city manager. To allow the situation in the police department to continue without strong intervention of some sort would only invite further, possibly even more disruptive, actions by the FOP, by the department's mid-level managers, or by Plunkett and the CMA. Clearly something had to be done, but what, and when?

James M. Banovetz, ed. Managing Local Government: Cases in Decision Making
(Washington, DC: ICMA 1990)